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THE EVOLUTION  OF CONVENTIONS 
BY H. PEYTON YOUNG1 
Consider an n-person game that is played repeatedly, but by different agents. In each 
period,  n  players  are  drawn at  random  from  a  large  finite  population.  Each  player 
chooses  an optimal strategy based on a sample of information about what others players 
have done in the past. The sampling defines a stochastic process that, for a large class of 
games that includes  coordination  games  and common  interest  games, converges  almost 
surely to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium can be interpreted as the 
"conventional" way of playing the game. If, in addition, the players sometimes experiment 
or make mistakes, then society occasionally switches from one convention to another. As 
the likelihood of mistakes goes  to zero, only some conventions (equilibria) have positive 
probability in  the  limit.  These  are  known  as  stochastically stable equilibria. They  are 
essentially the same as the risk dominant equilibria in 2 x 2 games, but for general games 
the  two concepts  differ. The  stochastically  stable  equilibria are computed  by finding a 
path  of  least  resistance  from  every  equilibrium to  every  other,  and  then  finding  the 
equilibrium that has lowest overall resistance. This is a special case of a general theorem 
on perturbed Markov processes that characterizes their stochastically stable states graph- 
theoretically. 
KEYWORDS:  Stochastic stability, equilibrium selection,  Markov process, fictitious play. 
The individual is foolish but the species is wise. 
Edmund Burke 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A  CONVENTION  IS  A  PATTERN  of  behavior  that  is  customary,  expected,  and 
self-enforcing.  Everyone conforms, everyone expects others to conform, and 
everyone  wants to conform  given that everyone  else conforms.2  Familiar  exam- 
ples include driving  on the right  when others drive  on the right,  going to lunch 
at noon if others  go at noon, accepting  dollar  bills in payment  for goods if others 
accept them, and so forth. Conventions  need not be symmetric.  Men conven- 
tionally  propose to women. Sailboats  on the port tack yield the right-of-way  to 
sailboats  on the starboard  tack. In some regions,  tenant farmers  customarily  get 
one-third  of the harvest  and landlords  get two-thirds,  whereas in other regions 
the reverse convention  holds.3 For each role in such asymmetric  interactions 
there is a customary  and expected  behavior,  and everyone  prefers  to follow the 
behavior  expected of him provided  that others follow the behavior  expected of 
them. Under these circumstances  we say that people follow a convention.  A 
convention  is an equilibrium  that everyone expects. But how do expectations 
become established  when there is more than one equilibrium? 
'This  work was supported in part by the Santa Fe Institute. I am indebted to Dean Foster, David 
Canning, Michael  Cohen,  Michihiro Kandori, David  Lane,  George  Mailath, and  Rafael  Rob  for 
stimulating conversations on this topic, and to the referees for several constructive suggestions. The 
usual caveat applies. 
2 See  Lewis (1967). 
3See  Bardhan (1984) for an account of sharecropping patterns in India. 
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One explanation  is that some equilibria  are a priori more reasonable than 
others. A  deductive theory of this type has been proposed by Harsanyi  and 
Selten (1988).  A second explanation,  proposed  by Schelling  (1960),  is that agents 
focus their attention on  one  equilibrium  because it  is  more prominent or 
conspicuous  than the others. Yet a third  explanation  is that, over time, expecta- 
tions converge on one equilibrium  through  positive feedback effects. Suppose 
that a game is played repeatedly,  either by the same or different  agents. Past 
plays have a feedback  effect on the expectations  and behaviors  of those playing 
the  game now because people pay attention to  precedent. Eventually,  one 
equilibrium  becomes entrenched as the conventional one, not because it is 
inherently  prominent  or focal, but because the dynamics  of the process happen 
to select it. 
This evolutionary  explanation  for the origin of conventions has been sug- 
gested in a variety  of papers,  but the precise dynamics  of the process by which 
expectations  and behaviors  evolve has not been clearly  spelled out.4 In particu- 
lar it is not clear  whether  it works.  Does the process  converge  to an equilibrium, 
and if so, are all equilibria  equally  likely to be selected? We shall show that the 
process  converges  in an asymptotic  sense provided  that the underlying  game has 
an  acyclic best  reply structure, and provided there is  sufficient stochastic 
variability  in the players'  responses.  In this case, society  is at or close to a Nash 
equilibrium  most of the time. Not all Nash equilibria  are equally likely to be 
selected, however.  In fact, typically  only one Nash equilibrium  will be observed 
with high probability  in  the  long run. Such an  equilibrium  is  said to  be 
stochastically  stable  (Foster and Young  (1990)).  Building  on work  of Freidlin  and 
Wentzell (1984) and Kandori,  Mailath, and Rob (1993), we shall show how to 
compute the stochastically  stable equilibria  by solving  a series of shortest  path 
problems  in a graph.  This is an application  of a more general result (proved  in 
the Appendix) that characterizes  graph-theoretically  the stochastically  stable 
communication  classes of a perturbed  finite-state  Markov  process. 
2.  OUTLINE  OF THE  MODEL 
We consider a fixed n-person game that is played once each period. The 
players  are drawn  at random  from a large,  finite population  of individuals.  Each 
player chooses an optimal strategy  based on his beliefs about his environment, 
which he takes to be stationary.  He forms his beliefs by looking at what other 
agents have done in the recent past. Since gathering information  is costly, 
however,  each player  knows  only a small  portion  of the history,  that is, he bases 
his current  actions  on a sample  of plays  from  recent time periods.  We shall also 
assume that the players occasionally  experiment  with different strategies, or 
simply  make mistakes. 
4 See,  for example, Lewis (1967), Axelrod (1986), Sugden (1986), Bicchieri (1990), and Warneryd 
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The strategies  that the agents choose in the current  period are recorded  and 
the game is played  again  in the next period  by another  random  draw  of n agents 
from the fixed population. Each of these agents takes a random sample of 
previous  plays and reacts accordingly.  Actions in earlier  periods therefore  have 
a feedback effect on actions by agents in later periods. To emphasize that 
convergence  in this model has nothing to do with learning at the individual 
level, we can assume that after an agent plays the game once he dies and is 
replaced  by a naive agent of the same type (same sample size and same utility 
function) but no prior information.  Thus each time an agent plays he starts 
afresh  and must ask around  to find out what is going on. This assumption  is not 
necessary  from a mathematical  point of view, but it underscores  the fact that we 
are ignoring  learning  and reputation  effects. 
The adaptive  dynamics  described  above define a Markov  chain whose states 
are the histories  of play truncated  to a finite number  of periods. It is similar  to 
fictitious  play in that agents  choose best replies to other agents'  past actions.  In 
fictitious play, however, agents base their decisions on the entire history of 
actions by other agents. Here we assume that agents base their decisions on 
limited  information  about actions  of other agents  in the recent  past, and they do 
not always  optimize.  These assumptions  seem less fictitious  than fictitious  play; 
hence we call this process adaptive  play. 
For general n-person games, adaptive play need not converge to a Nash 
equilibrium,  either pure or mixed, as we shall show below by example.  Never- 
theless, there is an important  class of games for which it does converge.  These 
games have the property  that, from any initial  choice of strategies,  there exists a 
sequence of best replies that leads to a strict,  pure strategy  Nash equilibrium. 
This class includes,  but is substantially  more general than, coordination  games 
and common interest games. For these  weakly acylic games, adaptive play 
converges  with probability  one to a pure strategy  Nash equilibrium  provided 
that the samples are sufficiently  incomplete and the players never make mis- 
takes. Incompleteness  creates enough stochastic  variability  to prevent the pro- 
cess from becoming stuck in  suboptimal cycles. Finite memory allows past 
miscoordinations  to be forgotten  eventually.  Once a given equilibrium  has been 
played for as long as anyone can remember,  then this equilibrium  becomes 
entrenched  as the "conventional"  way of playing  the game. It is an absorbing 
state of the process. One cannot say in advance,  of course, which equilibrium 
will become the conventional  one, since this depends on the vagaries of the 
process and on the initial state. What can be said is that some equilibrium  will 
eventually  be selected with probability  one, and it will not be a mixed strategy 
equilibrium. 
If the players  occasionally  experiment  or make mistakes,  however,  then more 
can be said. In this case the process has no absorbing  states; rather, it has a 
stationary  distribution  that describes  the relative  frequency  with which different 
states are observed in the long run. We shall show that, if the probability  of 
mistakes is small, then this stationary  distribution  is concentrated around a 
particular  subset  of pure strategy  Nash equilibria.  In fact, typically  it puts almost 60  H.  PEYTON  YOUNG 
all the weight on exactly one  equilibrium. This  stochastically stable equilibrium 
will be observed  with probability  close to one when the noise is very small. 
This concept  differs  in an important  respect  from  other notions  of equilibrium 
stability,  such as evolutionarily  stable strategies.5  An evolutionary  stable strategy 
is a strategy  (or frequency  distribution  of strategies)  that is restored  after a small 
one-time shock to the system.  A stochastically  stable distribution  is a distribu- 
tion that is restored repeatedly when the evolutionary  process is constantly 
buffeted by small random shocks. This concept was first defined for general 
evolutionary  processes  by Foster and Young (1990).  Subsequently  it was applied 
to a discrete  model of equilibrium  selection in a pioneering  paper by Kandori, 
Mailath, and Rob  (1993). They consider an  evolutionary  learning process 
defined on symmetric  2 x 2 games. In each period every player plays every 
other. Successful  strategies  are adopted  with higher  probability  than unsuccess- 
ful ones, and there is a small probability  that players  make mistakes.  Kandori, 
Mailath,  and Rob show that this stochastic  process selects the risk dominant 
Nash equilibrium  when the mistake probability  is small.6 The techniques of 
analysis in both papers are similar, and build on  the  theory of  perturbed 
dynamical  systems  developed  by Freidlin  and Wentzell  (1984). 
Using somewhat  different  methods, Canning  (1992) studies a general class of 
learning  models in which agents adapt their behavior  to the current  state and 
occasionally  make mistakes.  He shows that, under certain  regularity  conditions, 
the stationary  distribution  of the perturbed  process converges to a stationary 
distribution  of  the  unperturbed  one.  In this paper we  shall show how to 
characterize  the support  of the limiting  stationary  distribution  (the "stochasti- 
cally stable set") by solving  a series of shortest  path problems  in a graph.  Very 
often the support  consists  of a single absorbing  state, in which case we obtain a 
complete characterization  of the limiting distribution,  and a unique stochasti- 
cally  stable equilibrium.  We then apply  this result to compute  the stochastically 
stable equilibria  of adaptive  play. For 2 x 2 coordination  games we show that 
the risk  dominant  equilibrium  is the unique stochastically  stable equilibrium.  In 
coordination  games with more than two strategies, the stochastically  stable 
equilibrium  may be neither risk dominant  nor Pareto optimal, as we show by 
example.  Although  there appears  to be no simple  formula  that characterizes  the 
stable equilibria in  the  general case, they may be  computed by a  general 
algorithm  that is efficient  to implement. 
3.  ADAPTIVE  PLAY 
Let F be an n-person game in strategic  form, and let Si be the finite set of 
strategies  available  to player i. Let N  be a finite population  of individuals  that 
5Models  of  equilibrium selection  based  on  the  concept  of  evolutionarily stable  strategy (ESS) 
include Axelrod  (1984),  Fudenberg  and  Maskin (1990),  Samuelson  and  Zhang  (1992),  Crawford 
(1991), and Samuelson (1991a). For other models of evolutionary dynamics in games, see Samuelson 
(1988), Nachbar (1990), and Friedman (1991). 
6 Models of equilibrium selection  based on the concept of stochastic stability include Young and 
Foster (1991), Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Kandori and Rob (1992), and Samuelson (1991b). For 
other stochastic selection  models  see Evans and Honkapohja (1992a, 1992b), and Kirman (1992). EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  61 
is partitioned  into n nonempty  classes C1, C2,...,  Cn. Each member  of Ci is a 
candidate  to play role i in the game. For example,  C1 is the class of men, C2 is 
the class of women, and the game is Battle of the Sexes. We shall assume  that 
all individuals  in class i have the same utility  function ui(s)  for strategy-tuples 
S =  (511  S21 ...  ,  Sn)  E rI Si, which we shall identify with outcomes. 
Let  t = 1,2, .. ., denote  successive  time periods. The  game  G  is played once 
each period. In period t, one individual  is drawn  at random  from each of the 
n classes and is assigned to play the appropriate  role in the game. It will be 
convenient  to refer to the individual  playing  role i as player  "i" even though  the 
identity of this individual  may change from one period to the next. Player i 
chooses a pure strategy  si(t)  from his strategy  space according  to a rule that will 
be defined below. The strategy-tuple  s(t)  =  (sl(t), s2(t),...,  sn(t))  is recorded 
and will be referred  to as the play at time t. The history  of plays  up to time t is 
the  sequence  h(t)  = (s(1), s(2), ..  ., s(t)).  We  assume  that  the  histories  are 
anonymous:  it does not matter who played a given strategy  in a given period, 
only that it was played  by someone. 
The players decide how to choose their strategies  as follows. Fix integers k 
and m such that 1 < k < m. In period  t + 1 (t 2 m) each player inspects k plays 
drawn without replacement  from the most recent  m periods  t, t -  1, t -  2,..., 
t -  m + 1. The draws  are independent  for the various  players.  One way to think 
about the sampling  procedure  is that each player  "asks  around"  to find out how 
the game was played in recent periods. He stops when he has learned about k 
different plays within the last  m  periods (say because he  has reached his 
capacity to retain information).  Another way of thinking about the sampling 
procedure  is that each agent passively  hears about certain  precedents,  and k is 
the number  of precedents  that come to the agent's  attention.  In either case, the 
fraction k/m  measures  the completeness  of the agents' information  relative  to 
the surviving  precedents. It is not necessary  to assume that every subset of k 
precedents  out of the last m is equally  likely to constitute an agent's informa- 
tion. For example, an agent might be more likely to hear about recent prece- 
dents than more dated ones. It is enough  to assume  that every  subset of k has a 
positive  probability  of being agent i's information  for every i 
Assume for the  sake of  generality that the  first m  plays are randomly 
selected. Thus we can think of the sampling  process as beginning in period 
t =  m +  1  from  some  arbitrary  initial  sequence  of  m  plays  h(m)  = 
(s(1), s(2), ..  ., s(m)).  We then obtain a finite Markov chain on the state space H 
consisting  of all sequences of length m drawn  from HlSi,  beginning  with some 
arbitrary  "initial"  state h(m). 
SUCCESSOR:  A  successor  of  a state  h E H  is any state  h' E H  obtained  by 
deleting the left-most element of h and adjoining  a new right-most  element. 
The process moves from the current  state h to a successor  state h' in each 
period according  to the following  transition  rule. For each s E Si, let pi(slh) be 
7The  model  can be modified by assuming that different agents have different sample sizes. An 
application of this type is described in Young (1993). 62  H.  PEYTON  YOUNG 
the probability  that agent i  chooses s. We assume that pi(-)  is a  best-reply 
distribution  in the sense that pi(slh) > 0 if and only if there exists a sample of 
size k to which s is i's best reply, and that pi(slh) is independent  of t. If s is 
the right-most  element of h, the probability  of moving  from h to h' is 
(1)  Phh'  =11  pi(siIh). 
i=l,n 
Phh,  =  0 if h' is not a successor  of h. We call the process Po adaptive  play with 
memory m and sample size k. 
4.  CONVERGENCE  OF ADAPTIVE  PLAY  WHEN  THERE  ARE  NO  MISTAKES 
Let us begin by observing  that h is an absorbing  state of this process if and 
only if it consists of a strict pure strategy  Nash equilibrium  played m times in 
succession.  Suppose,  indeed,  that  h =  (s',...  ,  Sm)  is  an  absorbing state.  For 
each agent i let si be i's best reply  to some subset  of k plays  drawn  from h, and 
let s = (s,,...,  sn). By assumption, there is a positive probability of moving from 
h to h' = (S2, ..  .M,  S)  in one period. Since h is absorbing,  h = h' and hence 
S1=S  2.  Continuing  in this fashion we conclude that  Si=S2=  =  Sm  =S. 
Hence  h = (s, S, .. .,  s).  By construction, si is a best reply to some sample of  k 
elements from h. Hence si is a best reply to s-i  for each i. It must also be a 
unique best reply to  s-i,  because otherwise the process could move to  a 
successor  that is different  from h. So s is a strict, pure strategy  Nash equilib- 
rium. Conversely,  any state h  consisting of  m  repetitions of  a  strict, pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium  is clearly an absorbing  state. Such a state will be 
called a convention. 
If adaptive  play converges  to an absorbing  state, then clearly  the game must 
have a strict Nash equilibrium  in pure strategies. The existence of such an 
equilibrium  is not a sufficient  condition  for convergence,  however.  Consider  the 
following  variation  of an example  due to Shapley: 
EXAMPLE  1: 
a  b  c  d 
a  2,1  0,0  1,2  -1,-i 
b  1,2  2,1  0,0  -1,-i 
c  0,0  1,2  2,1  -1,-i 
d  -1,-i  -1,-i  -1,-i  3,3 
Here d is a best response  to itself, but it is not a best response  to any  mixture  of 
a,  b, and c. If the initial state does not involve d, then adaptive play (like 
fictitious play) cycles. Consider, for example, the case where  m = 2 and k = 1. 
Let the first two plays be (a) and (a).  In period 3, Column  will sample one of 
Row's  previous  two choices (both  a) and react  by playing  c. Row will sample  one 
of Column's  previous  two choices (a or c) with equal probability  and react by 
playing a or c. So the next play will be (a)  or (C)  with equal probability.  The EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  63 
a  a ca  of  c  c 
a  a  c  o  b 
a  bi 
ba  b  b  b  cb 
a  ~  ~a  aba  bb 
FIGURE  1.-A  recurrent  communication  class of adaptive  play  with m =2,  k =  1. 
process  therefore  moves  from  state [a' c] to state ['  'I with probability  one-half, 
and to state [a  c] with probability  one-half. The subsequent  transitions  form a 
cycle of length six imbedded  within a cycle of length twelve, as shown in Fig- 
ure 1. This cycle constitutes a recurrent  communication  class of the Markov 
process defined  by (1). 
When cycling  is built into the best reply  structure  of the game, as in the above 
example,  we cannot expect adaptive  play to converge.  Nevertheless,  there are 
many  games that do not have a cyclic best-reply  structure.  Consider  a two-per- 
son coordination  game in which both agents have the same number  of strate- 
gies, and each agent strictly  prefers to play his jth strategy  if and only if the 
other agent  plays  his jth strategy  for every  j. Clearly  there is no cycling  problem 
here: once  one  of  them chooses a  pure strategy and the  other responds 
optimally,  then they have achieved  a coordination  equilibrium. 
To take another example, suppose that the agents have common interests: for 
every two strategy  tuples s and s', either everyone  prefers s to s' or everyone 
prefers s' to s. Assume further  that no two strategy-tuples  are payoff equiva- 
lent. Given an arbitrary  strategy-tuple  s  that is not a Nash equilibrium,  there 
exists some  agent i  who  can  do  better by playing s'  instead of  si.  Let 
s=  (si, s-).  If s' is not Nash equilibrium,  there is some agent j  who can do 
better  by playing  s'  instead  of sj. Let s" = (sj', s'  j), and so forth.  At each step of 
this adjustment  process everyone's  utility  increases,  so the process cannot cycle 
and it must end at a pure strategy  Nash equilibrium.  Moreover,  this equilibrium 64  H.  PEYTON  YOUNG 
must be strict  because of the assumption  that no two strategy-tuples  are payoff 
equivalent  and the players  have common  interests. 
This construction  can be generalized  as follows. Let F be an n-person  game 
in normal  form on a finite strategy  space HSi. Define the best-reply  graph  of F 
as follows: each vertex is an n-tuple of strategies s E HISi, and for every two 
vertices s and s'  there is a directed  edge s -> s'  if and only if s #  s' and there 
exists exactly  one agent i such that s' is a best reply to s  and s'_i =  s-  . 
ACYCLIC  GAME:  A  game  F  is  acyclic  if  its  best  reply graph contains  no 
directed cycles. It is weakly  acyclic if, from any initial vertex s, there exists a 
directed path to some vertex s*  from which there is no exiting edge (a sink). 
Every  sink of the best reply graph  is clearly  a strict  Nash equilibrium  in pure 
strategies.  So a game is weakly acyclic  if, and only if, from every strategy-tuple 
there exists a finite sequence of best replies by one agent at a time that ends in 
a strict, pure strategy  Nash equilibrium.  We shall show that, for this class of 
games, adaptive  play converges  with probability  one provided  that sampling  is 
sufficiently  incomplete  and the players  do not make mistakes. 
Let F be a weakly  acyclic  n-person  game. For each strategy-tuple  s, let L(s) 
be the length of a shortest directed path in the best reply graph from s  to a 
strict Nash equilibrium, and let  L.  = maxsL(s). 
THEOREM  1: Let  F  be a  weakly acyclic n-person game.  If  k < m/(Lr  + 2), 
then adaptive play converges almost surely to a convention. 
PROOF:  Fix k and m, where k < m/(LF  + 2). We shall show that there exists 
a positive integer M, and a positive probability  p, such that from any state h, 
the probability  is at least p that adaptive  play converges  within M periods to a 
convention.  M and p are time-independent  and state-independent.  Hence the 
probability  of not reaching a convention after at least rM periods is at most 
(1  -p)r,  which goes to zero as r -  oo.  ). 
Let  h = (s(t  -  m +.1....  , s(t))  be the  state in period  t > m. In period  t + 1 
there is a positive  probability  that each of the n agents samples  the last k plays 
in  h,  namely,  (s(t  -  k +  ...,s(t))  = -q. There  is  also  a  positive  probability 
that, from  periods t + 1 to t + k inclusive,  every  agent draws  the sample 7-  every 
time. Finally, there is a positive probability  that, if an agent has a choice of 
several best  replies to  -q, then he  will choose the  same one  k  times in 
succession.  Thus there is a positive  probability  of a run (s, s, . . . , s) from  periods 
t + 1 to t + k inclusive.  Note that this argument  depends  on the agents'  memory 
being at least 2k -  1, since otherwise they could not choose the sample -q in 
period  t + k. 
Suppose that s happens to be a strict Nash equilibrium.  There is a positive 
probability  that, from periods t + k + 1 through t + m, each agent will sample 
only the last k plays,  in which case the unique  best response  of each agent i is EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  65 
si. So they play s for m -  k more periods.  At this point an absorbing  state has 
been reached,  and they continue  to play s forever. 
Suppose instead that s  is not a strict Nash equilibrium.  Since F  is weakly 
acyclic, there exists a directed path s, s', . . . , sr in the best reply graph such that 
S' is a strict Nash equilibrium. The first edge on this path is s -> s'. Let i be the 
index such that  s'  =s_  and  s'  is  a best  reply to  s _.  Consider the  event  in 
which agent i samples from the run of s established  in periods t + 1 to t + k 
and responds  by playing  s', while every  agent j #  i draws  the sample Y7  =  (s(t  - 
k + 1)  ...  ., s(t)).  By assumption, a best response of every agent j  to this sample 
is  si. These events occur together with positive probability,  and there is a 
positive probability  that they occur in every period from t + k + 1 to  t + 2k, 
assuming that m ?  3k -  1. The result is a run of  s' = (s,  s-i)  for k periods in 
succession. 
Continuing  in this fashion, we see  that there is a positive probability  of 
obtaining  a run of s, followed  by a run of s'...  followed eventually  by a run of 
Sr. Each run is of length  k, and the run of  Sr occurs from period  t + kr + 1 to 
t + kr + k. To reach this point may require that some agent look back kr + 
2k -  1 periods,  namely,  from  period  t + kr + k  to  period  t -  k + 1. This  is 
possible  because of the assumption  that k < m/(LF  + 2). 
After this, the process can converge  to the absorbing  state (sr,  Sr'...,  Sr)  by 
period t + kr + m  if each agent samples the previous k  plays from periods 
t+kr+k+  1 to t+kr+m  inclusive. 
Since r < Lr, we have established that, given an initial state h, there is a 
probability  Ph >  0  of  converging  to  an absorbing  state within M =  kLr + m 
periods. Letting p = minh  HPh  > 0,  it follows that from any initial state the 
process converges  with probability  at least p  to an absorbing  state within at 
most M periods.  This completes  the proof. 
We do not claim that the bound k < m/(L  + 2) is best possible for all 
weakly acyclic  games. Without  incomplete  sampling,  however,  the process may 
not converge to a pure Nash equilibrium.  Consider the following version of 
"Battle of the Sexes": 
EXAMPLE  2: 
Yield  Not Yield 
Yield  0,0  1, F 
Not Yield  FI, 1  0,0 
Let k = m, so that both players sample the same m plays in each period. 
Consider any initial sequence of  m  plays in which the players have always 
miscoordinated,  that is, they both yielded or they both failed to yield in each 
period. Let f  be the frequency  with which they yielded in this sequence. In the 
next period, Row yields if and only if 1 - f > fF2,  and Column  does the same. 
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so we never have to consider ties.) Thus, if they begin in a state of perfect 
miscoordination,  then they miscoordinate  forever. 
The  same holds if  memory is  unbounded, as  in  fictitious play: if  they 
miscoordinate  on  the first move, then they will continue to  miscoordinate 
forever. In this case the frequency  distributions  converge to the mixed Nash 
equilibrium  of the game in which  both players  yield with probability  1/(1 +  2). 
Note, however,  that their behaviors  do not converge  to the behavior  specified  by 
the mixed  Nash equilibrium,  because in each period their moves are correlated: 
either both yield or both do not yield. So even in 2 x 2 games fictitious  play 
need  not converge in  a  behavioral sense. This problem does not  arise in 
adaptive  play, because when it converges  to an absorbing  state, this state must 
correspond  to a Nash equilibrium  in pure strategies.  Hence the behaviors  also 
converge. 
The feature  of adaptive  play that allows  it to break  out of suboptimal  cycles  is 
incomplete sampling,  which introduces stochastic variation into the players' 
responses.  There is a possibility  that they will coordinate  by chance, and if they 
do so often enough the process eventually  locks in to a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium.  This equilibrium  then becomes the conventional  way of playing  the 
game, because for as long as anyone can remember,  the game has always  been 
played in this way. Therefore sampling  does not matter any more, because no 
matter  what samples  the agents  take, their optimal  responses  will be to play the 
equilibrium  that is already  in place. 
5.  ADAPTIVE  PLAY  WITH  MISTAKES 
Theorem  1 relies on the assumption  that, while agents  base their decisions  on 
limited  information,  they always  choose a best response  given  their information. 
This assumption  is clearly unrealistic.  Agents sometimes make mistakes;  they 
may also experiment  with nonoptimal responses. In this case the stochastic 
process does not converge to an absorbing  state, because it has no absorbing 
states. Mistakes constantly  perturb the process away from equilibrium.  If we 
assume,  however,  that all mistakes  are possible and that the mistake  probabili- 
ties are time-independent,  then the process does have a unique stationary 
distribution.  Hence we can study  its asymptotic  behavior.  When the probability 
of mistakes  is small, we shall show that this stationary  distribution  is concen- 
trated around a particular  convention (or, in the event of ties, a subset of 
conventions).  These are the stochastically  stable  conventions-the  ones that will 
be observed  with positive  probability  in the long run  when the noise is small  but 
nonvanishing.  We therefore obtain a theory of equilibrium  selection. As we 
shall see below, it yields (except in the 2 x 2 case) quite different  answers  than 
the theory  of Harsanyi  and Selten (1988). 
Our model of mistakes  generalizes  an approach  pioneered  by Canning  (1992) 
and Kandori,  Mailath,  and Rob (1993). Fix the sample size k and memory  m. 
Suppose that, in each time period, there is some small probability  cAi > 0 that 
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optimizing  based  on  a  sample  of  size  k.  The  ratio  Ai/Ai  is  the  relative 
probability with which a player of type i experiments as compared to a player of 
type j.  The  factor  E determines  the  probability with which players in general 
experiment. The event that i experiments is assumed to be independent  of the 
event  that  j  experiments  for  every  i oj.  For  every  i,  let  qi(sIh)  be  the 
conditional  probability  that  i  chooses  s e  Si  given  that  i  experiments  and 
the  process  is in state  h,  where  EseSiqi(sIh)  =  1 for every i  and  h.  We  shall 
assume that qi(s  I  h) is independent  of t, and that qi(s I  h) > 0 for all s E Si. The 
latter assumption is made for ease  of exposition; similar results hold provided 
the  qi(  ) have enough  support that  every state  is reachable  from every other 
state in a finite number of periods by agents who experiment. 
A priori we  do not  know the  distributions q = (q1( ), q2( ),  , q,(  )) or the 
relative probabilities of experimentation  A =  (A1,  A2 ... ., A"). It turns out, how- 
ever, that this does not matter. If the overall probability of experimentation E is 
small,  and  if  the  agents  experiment  independently  of  one  another,  then  the 
selected  equilibria are independent of  q and A. 
The perturbed process may be described as follows. Suppose that the process 
is in state h at time t. Let J  be a subset of j  players, 1 <  ?  < n. The probability 
is  Ej(Hj  E= jAj)(Hlj 0 j(1 -  cA1)) that exactly the players in J experiment and the 
others  do  not.  Conditional  on  this event,  the  transition probability of  moving 
from h to h' is 
Qih'  =  Hq1(sjlh)  Hpj(s.lh)  if h' is a successor of h and s is the 
hh'=  flqj(  right-most  element of h'; 
Qhh' =  0  if h' is not a successor of h. 
If no agent experiments, then the transition probability of moving from h to h' 
in one period is P2h'  as defined in (1). This event has probability fl1  n(l  -  EA  d. 
The perturbed Markov process therefore has the transition function: 
(2)  hh'  (  1  r  1  EAJPhh,  +  hh  E  I(1A1)  (1(1cA)  i=(),n  JcN,  J#c  ]EJ  0J  )) 
The  process  Pe  will  be  called  adaptive play  with memory m,  sample size k, 
experimentation  probabilities cAi and experimentation distributions qi. Note  that 
Po  is  the  process  defined  in  (1), which  we  shall  refer  to  as  the  unperturbed 
process. 
6.  ASYMPTOTIC  BEHAVIOR  OF ADAPTIVE  PLAY 
We  shall now characterize the  asymptotic behavior of process  (2) when  the 
overall probability of  experimenting  e  is close  to  zero.  Let  h  and  h'  be  two 
distinct states. If Pe  is in state h at time t, there is a positive probability that all 
players will  experiment  for  m  periods  in  succession.  Thus  there  is  a positive 
probability that  the  process  arrives at  state  h'  at  time  t + m,  so  Pe  is  irre- 
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periods, and also in exactly m + 1 periods. Hence Pe  has a unique stationary 
distribution  p/6 satisfying the  equation  AuYP'  =  A'.  The  process  is  strongly er- 
godic, and (with probability  one) A4 is the cumulative  relative frequency  with 
which state h will be observed  when the process runs for a very long time. It is 
also the probability  that h will be observed  at any given time t, provided  that t 
is sufficiently  large. 
The following  concept was introduced  by Foster and Young (1990). 
STOCHASTIC  STABILITY:  A state h E H  is stochastically stable relative  to the 
process Pe  if lim  e  OA  > 0. 
Over the long run, states that are not stochastically  stable will be observed 
infrequently  compared to  states that are, provided that the  probability  of 
mistakes  E is small.  If there is a unique  stochastically  stable state, then it will be 
observed  almost all of the time when E is small. 
We shall  now show  how to compute  the stochastically  stable states of adaptive 
play for a general n-person  game. In the process  we shall show that these states 
are essentially independent  of the particular  mistake distributions  qi and the 
mistake  probabilities  Ai. Then we shall specialize to the case of weakly acyclic 
games, and show that if k < m/(LF  + 2), every stochastically  stable state is a 
convention,  and if k and m are sufficiently  large, then typically  it is unique. 
MISTAKE:  Let h' be a successor  of h and let s be the right-most  element of 
h'. A  mistake in  the  transition  h  -*  h' is a component  si  of  s  that is not  an 
optimal  response  by agent i to any sample  of size k from h. 
A mistake  can only arise if a player  experiments,  but an experimental  choice 
need not be a mistake,  since it could (by chance) be an optimal  choice. 
RESISTANCE:  For any two states h, h'  the  resistance  r(h, h') is the total 
number  of mistakes  involved  in the transition  h --  h' if h' is a successor  of h; 
otherwise r(h, h') = oo. 
Let us now view the state space H  as the vertices of a directed graph. For 
every pair of states h, h' insert a directed edge h -*  h' if r(h, h') is finite, and let 
r(h, h') be its "weight"  or "resistance."  The edges of zero resistance  correspond 
to  the  transitions that  occur  with  positive  probability under  Po.  Let 
H1,  H2,...,  HJ  be the  recurrent  communication classes of  Pe.  These classes are 
disjoint,  and they are characterized  by the following  three properties:  (i) from 
every state there is a path of zero resistance  to at least one of the classes Hi; 
(ii) within each class Hi there is a path of zero resistance  from every state to 
every  other; (iii) every edge exiting  from Hi has positive  resistance. 
Given any two distinct classes Hi and Hj  consider all directed paths that 
begin in  Hi  and end in  Hj.  There is at least one  such path, because the 
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total resistance,  and let  this resistance be  denoted by  rij.  Clearly rij2 O. 
Computing  ri1 amounts  to solving  a shortest  path problem  in a directed  graph, 
for which there exist very efficient algorithms.  Note that ri  is independent  of 
which vertex in  Hi  is  the  starting point  and which vertex in  Hj  is  the 
termination  point, because every  two states within  the same class are accessible 
from each other by paths of zero resistance. 
Now define a new directed  graph  a  as follows:  there is one vertex i for each 
recurrent communication  class  Hi,  and for  every distinct 1 <i,  j < J  the 
directed  edge (i, j) has "weight"  or resistance  rij. The following  concept is due 
to Friedlin  and Wentzell  (1984). 
i-TREE:  An i-tree in  9 is a spanning  tree such that from every  vertex j #  i 
there is a unique  path directed  from j to i. 
For every  vertex i let Y7 be the set of all i-trees on S.  The resistance  of an 
i-tree r E Y7 is the sum of the resistances  of its edges, 
(3)  r(r)  =  E  rij. 
(i,  j)Er 
STOCHASTIC  POTENTIAL:  The stochastic  potential  of the recurrent  class Hi is 
the least resistance  among  all i-trees: 
(4)  Yi  =  min r  (r) . 
Computing yi  for  a  given set  of  weights rij  is  a  standard problem in 
combinatorial  optimization known as the  arborescence  problem. There exist 
algorithms  for solving it in the order of  Ij12 steps (see Chu and Liu (1965), 
Edmonds  (1967), and Tarjan  (1977)).  Since there are IJI  vertices  in G, and one 
arborescence  problem must be solved for each, the potential function can be 
computed  in O(IJI3)  steps. 
Note that the numbers  rij depend only on the number  of mistakes  in making 
various  transitions,  not on the relative  probability  with which specific  mistakes 
are made. Hence the potential function is independent of the parameters  Ai 
and qi. This is important,  for in applications  one would rarely  know  the relative 
probabilities  of various  mistakes,  only that they are possible. What matters is 
that the probability  of mistakes  is small, that all mistakes  are possible, and the 
agents make them independently  of one another. 
THEOREM  2:  Let  F  be  an  n-person game  on  a  finite  strategy space.  The 
stochastically stable states  of  adaptive play  PC are  the states  contained in  the 
recurrent  communication classes of Po  with minimum stochastic potential. These 
states are independent  of the experimentation  probabilities Ai and the experimenta- 
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COROLLARY:  If  F  is  weakly acyclic and  k < m/(LF  + 2),  the stochastically 
stable  states  of  adaptive play  are  the  convention(s)  of  minimum  stochastic 
potential. 
Theorem 2 follows from a general theorem on perturbed  Markov  processes 
that we  prove in  the  Appendix. The corollary is  a  direct consequence of 
Theorems  1 and 2. 
The stochastically  stable states are computed  in three steps. First  we identify 
the recurrent  communication  classes of the process Po without  mistakes.  For a 
general n-person game these classes can be quite complex. If the game is weakly 
acyclic and the sampling  is sufficiently  incomplete, however, then Theorem 1 
tells us that the recurrent  classes correspond  one-to-one with the strict pure 
strategy Nash equilibria,  which are easy to  identify. The second step is to 
compute the least resistance in moving from every recurrent  class to  every 
other. In theory this involves  solving  a series of shortest  path problems,  but in 
practice  the computation  can often be made directly  from the payoff  matrix  of 
the game. The third and final step is to construct  a complete directed graph 
with these resistances as weights, and to find the arborescence  having least 
weight. This identifies the stochastically  stable convention(s),  which is unique 
except in the event of ties. In the remainder  of the paper  we shall illustrate  the 
technique for 2 x 2 and 3 x 3 matrix  games, and show how the stochastically 
stable equilibria  relate to standard  concepts  of equilibrium  selection  such as risk 
dominance. 
7.  THE2x2CASE 
Let  F  be  a  2 x 2  matrix game with two strict Nash equilibria in  pure 
strategies.  It is clear that F is acyclic  and L. = 1. Without  loss of generality  we 
may  write F in the form 
1  2 
1  all,  bl,  a12, 
2  a21, b21  a22  b22 
where a1l >a21, b1l >b12,  a22  >a12, and b22>b21.  The strict, pure strategy 
Nash equilibria are (1, 1) and (2, 2).  Theorem 1 implies that, if  k < m/3, 
adaptive  play  without  mistakes  has  two  absorbing  states:  h1 = 
((1, 1),  (1, 1),  ... , (1, 1)) and h2 = ((2,  2), (2, 2), ...  , (2, 2)). To determine  which of 
these states is stochastically  stable,  we must compute  the path of least resistance 
from h1 to h2, and the path of least resistance  from h2 to h1. 
Let h1 be the state at time t = m. To go from h1 to h2 requires  that at least 
one player  choose strategy  2 by mistake.  Moreover,  he must  choose strategy  2 so 
often that the other's optimal  reply  is also strategy  2 for at least one sample  of 
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TABLE 1 
A SUCCESSION  OF k' MISTAKES  BY Row  CAUSES  THE  PROCESS  TO CONVERGE  TO  h2. 
2*  DENOTES  A  MISTAKEN  CHOICE  OF 2, 1(2) AN  OPTIMAL  CHOICE  OF EITHER  1  OR 2. 
Period  1  2 ...  m  m+1  m+2  m+k'  m+k'+l  ...  m+k'+k  m+k'+k+  1... 
Row  1  1...1  2*  2*  2*  1  ...  1(2)  2 
Column  1  1...1  1  1  1  2  -2  2 
Suppose,  for example,  that Row chooses 2 by mistake  from periods t = m + 1 
to  t = m + k'  inclusive,  where  k' < k. From  then  on  Row  makes  no  further 
mistakes.  These choices are mnarked  2* in Table I. 
If Column draws a sample that includes these k' choices of 2, as well as 
k -  k' choices of 1, then Column's  best reply  is 2 provided  that 
(1 -  kf/k)bl2  +  (k'/k)b22  ?  (1 -  k'/k)bll  + (k'/k)b2l; 
that is, 
(5)  k'?  >  1-1  k.  k  bl l-  b 12-b2l  + b22 
If equality holds in (5) then strategy 2 is among Column's best replies, so 
Column  will play it with positive  probability. 
Suppose that (5) holds and that Column's  sample happens to include Row's 
mistakes  in every  period  from m + k' + 1 to m + k' + k inclusive.  This event has 
positive  probability  provided  that m is sufficiently  large relative  to k. (It suffices 
that m ?  2k.) Then Column's  best reply  is to play 2 from periods m + k' + 1 to 
m + k' + k  and none  of  these  choices  are mistakes.  In period  m + k' + k + 1 
Row may sample Column's  choices of 2, while Column  samples Row's choices 
of 2, in which case their best replies are to play 2. In the next period there is 
again  a positive  probability  that both sample  enough  choices  of 2 to want to play 
2 again, and so forth. So with positive probability  the process converges  to the 
absorbing  state h2 with no further mistakes. In other words, k' mistakes are 
sufficient  to move the process from h1 to h2 provided  that k' satisfies  (5) and 
m/k  is large enough. 
Similarly,  the process converges  with positive probability  to  h2 if Column 
chooses 2 by mistake  k" times, where 
k" >  all  -  a2l  k. 
all  -  a12 -  a2l + a22 
Let 
R,  min  all  -  a2l  bl  -  b12 
all  -  a12 -  a2l  +  a22 bl'  -  b12 -  b2l + b22 J 72  H.  PEYTON  YOUNG 
For every real number  x, let [x] denote the least integer greater  than or equal 
to x. We have  just shown  that the resistance  in going from h1 to h2 is [R1k]. A 
similar argument  shows that the resistance in going from h2 to  h1 is [R2k] 
where 
R2=mi  /  a22-a12  b22-b2l 
Xa11  -a12--  a21 + a22  12-  b21  + b22 
If R1 > R2, then (1, 1) risk dominates  (2,2) in the terminology  of Harsanyi  and 
Selten (1988).  The pair (1, 1) weakly  risk  dominates  (2,2)  if R1 ? R2. If R1 > R2, 
then the unique stochastically  stable convention  is h1 for all sufficiently  large 
values of k and m/k.  If R1 = R2, then both h1 and h2 are stochastically  stable 
conventions  for all sufficiently  large values of k and m/k. 
Note  that the discrimination  of  the process grows with the  sample size, 
because the players can only respond to frequency  distributions  that involve 
integers  between 0 and k. For all sufficiently  large k, the process can discrimi- 
nate any difference  in resistance  between the two equilibria.  This leads to the 
following  definition. 
GENERIC  STABILITY:  A strict pure strategy  Nash equilibrium  is generically 
stable  if the associated  convention  is stochastically  stable  for all sufficiently  large 
k and m such that k < m/(LF  + 2). 
THEOREM  3:  Let  F  be a  2 x 2  matrix game with two strict Nash equilibria in 
pure strategies. The generically  stable equilibria  are the weakly risk dominant Nash 
equilibria. 
Kandori,  Mailath,  and Rob (1991)  obtain  a similar  result  for symmetric  games 
using a somewhat  different  dynamic  adjustment  process.  In their model, there is 
a single homogeneous  population  of N individuals  who play a symmetric  2 x 2 
game. At each time period t, zt  is the current number of players  who have 
"adopted"  strategy  1, and N -  zt  is the number  who have adopted strategy  2. 
For i =  1,2 let  r7i(zt)  be the total payoff to strategy i in state zt  when every 
player is matched once against every other. The dynamical  assumption  is that 
players  adopt successful  strategies  more often than unsuccessful  strategies.  That 
is, there is a deterministic  dynamic  zt+1  = f(zt)  such that 
for allO<z  <N  zt  Zt  if and only if  -1(Zt) 2 72(zt)v 
In addition, there is a small probability  E that each player will switch from 
-playing  strategy  1 to strategy  2 or vice versa, where the switches are indepen- 
dent across  players.  Using similar  techniques  to those developed  here, Kandori, 
Mailath,  and Rob show that the resulting  irreducible,  aperiodic  process P(N, E) EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  73 
has a stationary  distribution  that, for all sufficiently  large N, puts all of the 
probability  on the risk dominant  equilibria  as E goes to zero. 
8.  THE  3 x 3 CASE 
When the agents have three or more strategies,  there is no simple formula 
analogous  to risk dominance  that identifies the stochastically  stable equilbria. 
First, the path of least resistance  must be computed  from every equilibrium  to 
every other. Then a minimum  arborescence  problem  must be solved for each 
equilibrium.  We shall illustrate  by solving  an example. 
EXAMPLE  3: 
1  2  3 
1  6,6  0,5  0,0 
2  5,0  7,7  5,5 
3  0,0  5,5  8,8 
The pairs (i, i) are the strict,  pure strategy  Nash equilibria,  i = 1,  2,3. Let hi 
denote the convention  in which  (i, i) is played m times in succession.  Theorem  1 
says that these are the absorbing  states of the unperturbed  process provided 
that k < m/3.  Let us compute the path of least resistance  from every conven- 
tion to every  other. 
Suppose that the perturbed  process is in state h1. To exit to h2 or h3, one 
agent must choose a sufficient  number  of 2's or 3's (or both) to cause the other 
agent to choose 2 or 3. Since the game is symmetric,  it does not matter  which 
player makes the mistakes and which player reacts. Assume that the Column 
player chooses 2 at least k"  = [(1/8)k]  times in succession. If Row samples 
these choices (plus k -  k" choices of strategy  1), then Row's best reply is also 
strategy  2. At this point there is a positive probability  that the process will 
converge to h2 with no further mistakes. (This relies on the assumption  that 
k < m/3.)  It may  be checked  that this is the least number  of mistakes  to go from 
h1 to h2 by any route. Thus the least resistant  path is direct in the sense that it 
only involves  strategies  1 and 2. 
Not all paths of least resistance are direct, however. For example, suppose 
that the process  is in state h3 and we want to exit to state h2. The direct  route is 
for one player to choose strategy  2 by mistake at least [(3/5)k]  times, which 
causes the other player to reply with strategy 2. But if one player chooses 
strategy  1 by mistake at least [(3/8)k]  times (and at most (5/6)k  times), then 
the best reply  of the other player  is strategy  2. Thus the indirect  route has lower 
resistance  when k is large enough. 
Another example of an indirect  route involves  the transition  from h1 to h3. 
The direct route requires some player to make [(5/8)k]  mistaken choices of 
strategy  3, since otherwise  strategy  1 or 2 is a better reply.  But there is a path of 
less resistance,  namely,  go first  to h2 and then to h3. The total resistance  of this 74  H.  PEYTON  YOUNG 
hI 
(1/8)k  (7/8)k  (21/40)  (5/6)k 
(3/8)k 
h2  (2/5)k  h3 
FIGURE 2.-Pairwise  resistances (unrounded) for the pure strategy equilibria of Example 3. 
path is [(1/8)k] + [(2/5)k], which is approximately  (21/40)k  when k is large. 
The resistances  between every  pair of equilibria  are shown  in Figure 2. 
For each vertex hi there are three hi-trees,  and the hi-tree of least resistance 
determines  the stochastic  potential of hi, as shown  in Figure  3. 
It is readily  seen that the least resistant  tree is rooted at h2  and has total 
resistance  [(1/8)k] + [(3/8)k]. For all sufficiently  large k this is the unique  tree 
of least resistance,  so h2 is the unique generically  stable convention.  The risk 
dominant equilibrium,  however, is  strategy 3.  It is  also the Pareto optimal 
equilibrium.  To verify  risk  dominance,  one checks  that strategy  3 risk  dominates 
strategy  2 in the subgame  restricted  to strategies  2 and 3, and that strategy  3 risk 
dominates strategy 1 in the subgame restricted to  strategies 1 and 3. (See 
Harsanyi  and Selten (1988).) 
There are essentially two respects in which risk dominance and stochastic 
stability  differ.  First, they employ  different  notions of resistance.  Strategy  i risk 
dominates  j  if it requires  fewer mistakes to go from j  to i than from i to j 
within the subgame consisting of just these two strategies (i.e., by a direct 
route). Stochastic stability  requires us to look at all transitions  from i  to j, 
including  those that involve  other strategies.  The second distinction  is that risk 
dominance  is only defined  when there is one strategy  that risk dominates  every 
other  in pairwise  comparisons.  Such a strategy  may  not exist  because  of cycles  in EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  75 
h  ~~~~~~h  h 
(3/8)k  (2/5)k 
h2  (3/8)k  h2  (3/8)k  h 
h.3  (2/5)k  h3  (2/5)k  h3 
FIGURE 3.-The  nine hi-trees (i =  1, 2,3).  Resistances  are not rounded. 
the  pairwise comparisons.  Stochastic  stability, by contrast,  relies  on  a  global 
criterion (the resistance of spanning trees) to compare the stability of different 
strategies. The difference between  the two concepts  may therefore be summa- 
rized as follows: risk dominance  selects  the  equilibrium that is easiest  to flow 
into  from every other  equilibrium considered  in  isolation  (assuming  such  an 
equilibrium exists). Stochastic stability selects  the equilibrium that is easiest  to 
flow  into  from  all  other  states  combined,  including  both  equilibrium  and 
nonequilibrium states. 
9.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have shown how an equilibrium can evolve in a game that is 
played repeatedly by different agents-.  The model is similar to fictitious play in 
that agents' expectations are shaped by precedent.  It differs in that agents base 
their  choices  on  an  incomplete  knowledge  of  recent  precedents  and  they 
occasionally  make  mistakes.  These  assumptions  seem  more  natural than  the 76  H.  PEYTON  YOUNG 
deterministic dynamics of fictitious play, so we can justify them on the grounds 
of realism. They also play an important technical role: by introducing noise into 
the dynamic adjustment process, they select  among pure strategy Nash equilib- 
ria for weakly  acyclic games,  and  among  more  complex  regimes  for  general 
n-person games. Unlike  other evolutionary models, these  perturbations are not 
one-shot  affairs but  form  an  integral part of  the  dynamics. By incorporating 
noise directly into the dynamics, one is led to a different criterion of equilibrium 
selection than classical notions like evolutionary stability and risk dominance. 
Several questions remain to be explored. One is the sensitivity of the equilib- 
rium selected  to the way in which the model  is specified. We have shown that 
the stochastically stable equilibria are invariant with respect to the distribution 
of  the  perturbations  so  long  as  they  are  independent  across  players,  have 
positive  support,  and  are  stationary.  In  addition,  we  showed  that  for  2 x 2 
games the stochastically stable equilibria are independent of m and k so long as 
m/k  and  k  are sufficiently large. It is not  clear whether  this result holds for 
weakly acyclic games in general, although we know of no examples in which it 
fails to hold. 
A  second  question  is  whether  the  stochastically  stable  equilibria  can  be 
characterized more succinctly. The algorithm described in the Appendix shows 
how to compute the stochastically stable equilibria in a wide class of dynamical 
models with perturbations, but it does not describe these equilibria in terms of a 
simple formula. There  is no  reason to  think that such a formula exists in the 
general case. In specific classes of games, however, one  can sometimes  exploit 
the payoff structure to obtain more specific answers. Kandori and Rob (1992) 
explore  this  issue  for  pure  coordination  games  and  differentiated-product 
oligopoly games. 
Another  class  of  games  where  one  can  obtain  an  explicit  formula for  the 
stochastically stable equilibria is the bargaining problem. Consider the two-per- 
son Nash demand game in which each player demands a share of  a fixed pie. 
They get their shares if the shares sum to 1 or less; otherwise they get nothing. 
The  strategy spaces  can  be  made  discrete  by  assuming  that  the  shares  are 
rounded to a large, fixed number of decimal places. Let two disjoint populations 
of agents play this game adaptively, where all members of one population have 
utility function u and the others have utility function v. Then the stochastically 
stable equilibria are close to the Nash solution. (See Young (1993).) 
A  third issue  is whether  and how the  stochastically stable equilibria change 
when the  agents are allowed more  decision-making scope.  For example, what 
happens  when  the  agents  learn  as  they  play  the  game  over  time,  or  make 
inferences  about  the  others'  decision  rules,  or  choose  optimal  sample  sizes 
based on their costs of gathering information? These  additions complicate both 
the state space and the stochastic process. They may also require more common 
knowledge on the part of the agents. In any event, if the agents make mistakes 
infrequently  and  independently  of  each  other,  then  the  stochastically  stable 
states can  still be  analyzed using the  general  techniques  developed  here.  We 
have deliberately  chosen  to  focus  on  the  case  where  agents  do  not  learn  in EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  77 
order  to  show  that  convergence  to  equilibrium can  occur  with  no  common 
knowledge  and with only a minimum degree  of  rationality on the  part of  the 
agents. Society can "learn" even when its members do not. 
School  of  Public Affairs and  Dept.  of  Economics,  University of  Maryland, 
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Manuscript  received  November, 1989;  final revision received March, 1992. 
APPENDIX 
Here we  shall prove a general result on finite Markov chains of which Theorem  2 is a special 
case.  This  result  amounts  to' a  finite  version  of  results  obtained  by  Freidlin  and  Wentzell  for 
continuous  diffusion  processes  (see  Freidlin  and  Wentzell  (1984,  pp.  186-187)).  Let  Po  be  a 
stationary Markov chain defined on a finite state space X.  Suppose that this process is subjected to 
a small perturbation or noise.  By this we  mean that with high probability the process follows  the 
transition function  Po,  but with  small  probability certain  transitions occur  that  could  not  have 
occurred via  Po.  We  shall  assume  that  the  perturbed  process  can  be  modelled  as  a  stationary 
Markov chain on  X  with transition function  P?,  where  E is a scalar parameter that measures the 
overall level of noise,  E takes on all values in some interval (0, a], and the following conditions hold 
for all x, y E X: 
(6)  P?  is aperiodic and irreducible for all E E (0, a], 
(7)  lim PXY  = PO 
xy  xy, 
(8)  Px'y > 0 for some E implies 3r ?  0 s.t. 0 <  lim E-rPxey <  o. 
Condition (6) implies that the perturbed process has a unique stationary distribution A'  for every 
E E  (0, a].  Condition  (7)  says  that  the  perturbed  process  converges  to  the  unperturbed  one. 
Condition (8) says that the transition x --  y  is either impossible in the perturbed process  P?  for all 
E E (0, a], or P.,  is of order Er  for some unique real number r 2 0 as E becomes small. In the latter 
case  we  set  r(x,  y) = r  and  call  r(x,  y)  the  resistance of  the  transition  x --  y.  By virtue  of  (7), 
r(x, y) = 0 if and only if Po%  >  0. Thus the transitions of zero resistance are the same as the feasible 
transitions under P0. Any family of Markov processes  P?  satisfying (6)-(8)  will be called a regular 
perturbation of  Po. 
The family P?  defined by (2) in the text is a regular perturbation of the process  P?  defined in (1), 
and  the  resistance  of  a  one-period  transition  is  the  minimum  number of  mistakes  required  to 
make it. 
By  hypothesis,  the  perturbed  process  P?  is  aperiodic  and  irreducible,  so  it  has  a  unique 
stationary distribution A'  for every E >  0. The  unperturbed process,  by contrast, may have many 
stationary distributions. We are going to show that lim6  = ,u?,  where AO  is one of the stationary 
distributions of  Po.  Thus the perturbations effectively select among the  stationary distributions of 
Po. The support of the stationary distribution AO  is a subset of the recurrent communication classes 
of P0. Thus the perturbations effectively select among the recurrent communication classes. In fact, 
the  perturbations typically select  exactly one  communication  class  of  P0.  The  selected  class  (or 
classes) are computed by finding a path of least resistance from every recurrent communication class 
to every other. Hence the selected classes depend only on the resistances r(x,  y), that is, only on the 
order of magnitude of the various perturbations. This is important in applications, where the general 
form of the perturbations may be known, but not their precise values. 
To characterize the limiting distribution A,u we shall define two directed graphs. The first graph 
G has vertex set  X (the set of all states) and there is a directed edge from state x  to state y  if and 
only if the  one-period  transition  x --  y  has positive probability under P6  for all sufficiently small 
E >  0. In this event, let  r(x,  y),  as defined by (8), be the weight or resistance of the directed edge 
(x, y). 
Let the recurrent communication classes of  P0  be denoted  by X,,...,  XJ. These  classes can be 
characterized within  the  graph  G  as  follows:  (i)  from  every vertex  there  exists  a  path  of  zero 78  H. PEYTON YOUNG 
resistance to at least one of the classes  Xi; (ii) for every two vertices x  and y within the same class 
Xi there is a path of zero resistance from x  to y and vice versa; (iii) every edge from a vertex in Xi 
to a vertex not in Xi  has positive resistance. 
For every i =kj let rij be the least resistance among all directed paths that begin in Xi and end in 
Xj. (For this purpose it is sufficient to fix any two states  x E Xi and y E X.  and find a least-resistant 
path from x  to  y.) This is well-defined because there is at least one path from every class to every 
other, by virtue of the assumption that  P?  is irreducible when  E >  0. 
Now define a second graph  9  as follows: the vertices are the indices (1, 2,. ..,  J}, and for each 
pair (i, j) there is a directed edge from i to j with weight rij.  9  is normally much smaller than G; in 
fact it may have only a few vertices. In the case of a 2 X 2 coordination game, for example, adaptive 
play has only two recurrent classes (assuming k < m/3),  so  9  has exactly two vertices. 
Define  a j-tree in  9  to be a spanning subtree of  9  such that for every vertex  i = j  there exists 
exactly one directed path from i to j. Let 57j  be the set of all I-trees in  i9. For each j find a j-tree 
of least total resistance, and let this resistance be denoted by yj. yj is the stochastic potential of the 
class Xj. 
We shall now prove the following result, of which Theorem 2 is a special case. 
THEOREM  4:  Let Po  be a  stationary Markov process on  the finite state space X  with recurrent 
communication classes X1,...,  XJ.  Let P?  be a regular perturbation of Po,  and let A' be its unique 
stationary distribution  for every small positive 6.  Then: 
(i)  as E -o 0, A' converges to a stationary distribution AO  of Po. 
(ii)  x  is stochastically stable (AOLx  >  0)  if  and only if x  is contained in a  recurrent class Xj  that 
minimizes yj. 
Freidlin  and Wentzell  (1984,  pp.  186-187)  prove  an  analogous  result  when  the  unperturbed 
process is a deterministic dynamical system described by a differential equation on a manifold, and 
the  perturbed  process  is  a  family  of  diffusion  processes  whose  drift  converges  to  that  of  the 
unperturbed process as the  diffusion goes  to zero. The  minimum resistance between  two states  is 
found by integrating a certain "action functional" along all continuous paths from one  state to the 
other  and  taking the  infimum over  all  such  paths.  (See  Freidlin  and  Wentzell  (1984,  p.  161).) 
However,  their  result  requires  numerous  regularity  conditions  not  needed  here  (Freidlin  and 
Wentzell  (pp.  155 and  169)), and in any event  the  characterization given in Theorem  4  is much 
simpler analytically. 
The proof will be divided into two lemmas. In the first, we establish statement (i) and show how 
to characterize the  stochastically stable states by solving a series of arborescence  problems in the 
graph G.  In the  second  lemma we  show that this characterization can be  reduced  to the  simpler 
problem of solving arborescence problems in the (typically) much smaller graph  9. 
We begin by characterizing the stochastically stable states in terms of the graph G, whose vertex 
set is the whole state space X.  For any vertex  z  of  G a z-tree T is a spanning tree in G such that, 
for every vertex  x  * z,  there exists a unique directed path from  x  to  z.  Let  1T  be the  set of all 
z-trees in G and define 
(9)  y(z)  =  min  E  r(x, y). 
TE  z [x,y]ET 
The following result generalizes Theorem  1 in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), and utilizes  a 
lemma on Markov chains due to Freidlin and Wentzell.8 
LEMMA  1: Let P6  be a regular perturbation of P0  and let A' be its stationary distribution. Then 
lim6  Ej =  0  exists and  juto is  a  stationary distribution of  Po.  Moreover, /uo > 0  if  and  only  if 
y(x)  < y(y)  for all y in X. 
8 Using  different methods,  Canning (1992) proves that A  converges to a stationary distribution 
Au of  P0  under more general conditions, but he does  not characterize the support of the limiting 
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PROOF: Let  P'  be  the  transition  function  of  any  aperiodic,  irreducible,  stationary  Markov 
process defined on the finite space X. For each  z E X,  define the number 
PZ'=  E  H  PI,y 
Te -  (x,  y)e  T 
where p'  is positive because  P'  is irreducible. Let 
,utz  =  pz/  Px ) > ? 
xeX 
It  may then  be  verified  that  siP'=,p',  from  which  it  follows  that  ,u'  is  the  unique  stationary 
distribution of  P'. (See  Freidlin and Wentzell (1984, Chapter 6, Lemma 3.1).) 
Now let us apply this result to the process  P?  hypothesized in  Lemma 1. Let 
(10)  p?=  E  H  XJy 
Te -  (x,y)eT 
By the above result, the stationary distribution of  PE  is given by the formula 
E1)  y  = 
"I 
/  E  X- 
XEX 
Define  y(z)  as in (9)  and let  yy*  = minzy(z).  We  are going to  show that  g?  > 0 if and only if 
y(z)  = y'*. Choose a z-tree  T with resistance  y(z)  and consider the identity 
(12)  E6y  rL  p?  =r(T)  -  I  Er(xy)pe 
(x,y)GT  (x,y)eT 
By (8), 
(13)  limE -r(xY)PxEy  >0  for every  (x,y)E  T. 
If r(T) =  y(z)  > y*,  it follows from (12) and (13) that 
limE-Y*  H  PXy =0' 
E*0  (x,  y)e  T 
so 
lim E-Y*p  -=0. 
e-O 
Similarly, if r(T) = y(z)  =  y* we obtain 
(14)  limE  -*  >  O. 
From (13), (14), and the identity 
A  =  EpZ?/  E E-6  p  ? 
XEX 
it follows that 
lim,u?z=0  if  y(z)>  y* 
e-O 
and 
lim ,u4  > 0  if  y(z)  = y*. 
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Thus we have shown that urn6  . 0IL  exists, and its support is the set of states  z  that minimize y(z). 
Since  AE satisfies  the  equation  AEPE  =  AE for  every  E > 0,  it  follows  from  assumption  (7)  that 
,?p?  = ,o.  Hence  ,u? is a stationary distribution of  Po. This completes  the proof of Lemma 1. 
Since ,u? is a stationary distribution of Po, AO?  = 0 for every state z that is not recurrent under Po. 
To find the stochastically stable states, it therefore suffices to compute the potential  function only 
on the recurrent states. 
It  is  easy  to  see  that  all  states  in  the  same  recurrent  communication  class  have  the  same 
potential. Suppose, in fact, that x  is in Xi  and T is an x-tree  in G  with potential  y(x).  Let  y  be 
some other vertex in X.. Choose a path of zero resistance from x to y. The union of this path and T 
contains a y-tree T' that has the same resistance as T. From this it follows that the potential of y is 
no larger than the potential of x, and a symmetric argument shows that it is no smaller. Hence  they 
have the same potential. 
We shall now show that the potential on each recurrent class Xj is precisely yj, namely, the least 
resistance among all j-trees  in the graph  9.  Thus the potential may be computed simply by solving 
an arborescence problem on the reduced graph cO. 
LEMMA  2:  y(x)  =  yj is the stochastic potential of all states x E Xj. 
PROOF: Fix one state xi  in each recurrent class Xj. We shall show first that y(xj)  < yj; then we 
shall show the reverse inequality. 
Fix a class Xj and a j-tree  r  in  9  whose resistance  r(r)  equals yj. For every i Aj, there exists 
exactly one outgoing edge (i, i') E r. In the graph G (whose vertices are the states) choose a directed 
path  Dii, from  xi  to  xi,  having resistance  rii,. Now  choose  a directed  subtree  Ti that spans  the 
vertex set  Xi  such that from every vertex in Xi  there is a unique directed path to xi.  Since Xi  is a 
communication class of  Po,  Ti can be chosen so that it has zero resistance. 
Let  E  be the union of all of the edges in the trees  Ti and all of the edges in the directed paths 
Dii, where (i, i') E r. By construction, E contains at least one  directed path from every vertex in X 
to the fixed vertex  xi.  Therefore  it contains  a subset  of edges  that form an  x1-tree T  in G. The 
resistance of  T is clearly less than or equal to the sum of the resistances of the paths  Dii,, so it is 
less than or equal to r(r).  Thus y(xj)  <  yj  = r(r)  as claimed. 
To show that  y(xj)  ?  yj, fix a class j  and a least-resistant  xj-tree  T among all  xj-trees  on  the 
vertex set  X.  Label each  of  the  specially chosen  vertices  xi  by the  class "i" to which it belongs. 
These will be  called  special vertices. A  junction  in  T  is any vertex  y  with at least  two incoming 
T-edges. If the junction  y is not a special vertex, label it "i" if there exists a path of zero resistance 
from y to  Xi. (There exists at least one such class because they are the recurrent classes of  PO; if 
there are several such classes  choose  any one  of them  as label.) Every labelled vertex is either  a 
special vertex or a junction (or both), and the label identifies a class to which there is a path of zero 
resistance. 
Define the special predecessors of a state x E X  to be the special vertices  xi  that strictly precede 
x  in the fixed tree  T (i.e.,  such that there is a path from  xi  to  x  in T)  and such that there  is no 
other special vertex  xj on the path from xi  to x. 
(15)  If xi is a special predecessor of a labelled vertex  x,  then the unique  path in the tree  from xi 
to x has resistance at least rik,  where k is the label of x. 
Property (15) clearly holds for the tree T because any path from the special vertex xi  to a vertex 
labelled "k" can be extended by a zero resistance path to the class Xk, and the total path must have 
resistance at least  rik.  We shall now perform certain operations on the tree T that preserve property 
(15), and that bring it into a form that is more or less congruent to a j-tree  in  9.  We shall do this by 
successively eliminating all junctions that are not special vertices. 
Suppose that  T contains a junction  y  that is not a special vertex, and let  its label be "k". We 
distinguish two cases, depending on whether the special vertex  Xk  is or is not a predecessor of  y in 
the tree. 
Case 1:  If Xk  is not a predecessor of y in the tree (see Figure 4), cut off the subtree consisting of 
all edges and vertices that precede  y and glue them onto the tree at the vertex  Xk. 
Case 2:  If Xk,  is a predecessor of  y (see Figure 5), cut off the subtree consisting of all edges and 
vertices that precede  y (except for the path from Xk  to y and all of its predecessors) and glue them 
onto  Xk. EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  81 
cut 
FIGURE  4a.-Case  1 surgery: before. 
ji  H  L  K  ~~~~~~~~~~~~paste 
FIGURE  4b.-Case  2 surgery: after. 
Both of  these  operations  preserve property (15) because  Xk  and  y  have the  same label.  Each 
operation reduces by one the number of junctions that are not special vertices. Thus we eventually 
obtain an xi-tree  T*  in which every junction is a special vertex, property (15) is satisfied, and T* 
has the same resistance as the original tree T. 
Now construct a j-tree  r  on the vertex set  J  as follows. For every two classes  i  and i'  put the 
directed edge (i, i') in r  if and only if  xi  is a special predecessor  of  xi,  in T*.  By construction, r 





FIGURE  5a.-Case  2 surgery: before. 
paste 
FIGURE 5b.-Case  2 surgery: after. EVOLUTION  OF  CONVENTIONS  83 
least rig. The paths  W  are edge-disjoint because every junction is one of the special vertices. Since 
T*  contains  their  union,  the  resistance  of  T*  is  at  least  E(i,  i')  e  Trii  But  E(ii')  ETrrii'  is  the 
resistance of  T.  Hence  y(xj)  = r(T*)  2  = r(r)  2  yj as claimed. 
This completes  the proof of Lemma 2, which, together with Lemma 1, establishes Theorem 4. 
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